Affective processes were predicted to play a critical role in choices among complex stimuli. As hypothesized, self-report measures of individual differences in affective information processing were associated with choices in a task designed by Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson (1994) 
Twogrowingbodiesofresearchhavedemonstratedthe
influence of affect (feelings or emotions about a specific object) and individual differences in affective information processing on judgments, decisions, and behaviors (e.g., Fowles & Missel, 1994; Kahneman, Frederickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Peters & Slovic, 1996; Zinbarg & Mohlman, 1998) . We attempt to improve on this past research in three ways. First, most psychological research on decision making has used stimuli that already have affective meaning to participants (e.g., extremely cold water feels painful; Kahneman et al., 1993) . This approach may yield a great deal of information about factors that influence the relation between affect and choice once affect has developed while shedding little or no light on factors involved in the initial acquisition of affect and its relation to choice processes. In the present study, participants acquire affect as they make a series of choices among initially unfamiliar objects. Second, previous decision-making studies have seldom made any allowance for individual variation; in the present study, an examination of individual differences helps us to understand and explain choice processes with a model of the mind that includes affect as central to the development of choice behavior (e.g., Damasio, 1994) .
Third, other research has demonstrated correlations between affective reactivity and simple choices among either gains or losses (e.g., Zinbarg & Mohlman, 1998) . These approaches to the study of affect and choice provide important information about factors that influence the relation between affect and simple choices. However, life itself is not so simple. In real life, we rarely encounter situations or objects that are completely rewarding or altogether punishing. Bran cereal may not taste very good, but it is good for us. The present study focuses on the development of affect toward objects where the objects themselves are complex mixtures of gains and losses.
One approach that has great promise for addressing these limitations in a laboratory setting is to develop par-adigms for the study of the acquisition of affective feelings about stimuli that are initially affectively neutral to all participants. Learning paradigms enable us to analyze initial differences in responding to the stimuli as well as differences that emerge over the course of learning. Thus, learning paradigms assessing individual differences in the acquisition of affect should allow us to examine a model of the processes underlying the development of affect and its influence on choices. One of the primary aims of the current investigation was to use learning paradigms with complex stimuli to study individual differences in the acquisition of affective feelings and their influence on choice behavior.
Affective Reactivity and Choice
Previous research on the relation between affective reactivity and choices has been conducted primarily by clinical psychologists and neuropsychologists attempting to characterize the information processing abnormalities that underlie some pathology. Because these abnormalities may represent extreme ends of a normal continuum of information processing, results with clinical patients can illuminate issues in the normal population. Antonio Damasio (1994) , for example, wrote eloquently about the critical impact of affective information processing on decision-making capabilities. He and his colleagues conducted extensive studies with patients who have damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and concluded that the poor decision capabilities of these individuals were related to their abnormal affective reactions rather than to their cognitive capacities (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Damasio, 1994; Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1991; Saver & Damasio, 1991) .
Damasio and his colleagues (Bechara et al., 1994) devised a clever gambling task to mimic the uncertainties of gains and losses in a real-world environment to test the idea that affective reactivity was related to good decision performance. (We conducted a pilot study using this original task and then modified the task for the present study.) In their experiment, participants (both patients with bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortices and normal controls) were instructed to select cards repeatedly from four decks placed facedown in front of them. They were told to earn as much play money as possible and lose as little as possible. The decks were arranged such that two of the decks had low gains and low losses and, overall, would win money, whereas the other two decks had high gains and high losses and, overall, would lose money. Damasio equated good judgment with more selections from the winning decks. Virtually all patients in this experiment showed poor judgment (as they did in real life, according to Damasio) by choosing from the losing decks, whereas the majority of the nonpatients showed good judgment by gravitating toward the winning decks (Bingham & Campbell, 1997) .
Normal participants also developed skin conductance responses (SCRs) in anticipation of drawing from the bad decks but prior to conscious awareness of the existence of good and bad decks (Damasio, 1994) . The presence of these SCRs was associated with the participant's switching over to the good decks. Damasio and his colleagues interpreted these results as being consistent with his somatic marker hypothesis. "Somatic markers are . . . feelings. These emotions and feelings have been connected, by learning, to predicted future outcomes of certain scenarios" (Damasio, 1994, p. 174) . They argued that prior bad outcomes would lead automatically to the conditioned avoidance of the same choice in the future. Similarly, prior good outcomes would lead to a conditioned attraction to the same choice. As a result, these affective feelings would increase the accuracy and efficiency of the decision process and their absence would degrade decision performance. Emotions play a central, indeed an indispensable, role in those changes in behavior or performance which are said to represent "learning." The emotions are involved, first of all, in that they are, strictly speaking, what is learned . . . we assume [the emotions] are the reactions which are most readily and importantly conditionable; and once conditioned, to independent and/or response-dependent stimuli, they then guide and control performance in a generally sensible, adaptive manner. (p. 307) These anticipatory feelings (somatic markers or conditioned emotions) are an operational definition of affect as conceived in the present article.
Individual Differences in Affective Reactivity
In the general population, individual differences in the intensity of affective reactions also might affect judgments and decisions (e.g., Larsen & Diener, 1987; Rusting, 1998) . Rusting and Larsen (1998) , for example, demonstrated that higher extraversion scores (extraversion is thought to index reactivity to positive events 2 ) were associated with increased processing of, and better performance on, tasks that involved positive material (compared to negative and neutral material). Zinbarg and Mohlman (1998) found support for a predicted relation between a measure of trait anxiety (reactivity to anxiety-provoking events) and learning about losses in a choice task.
Studies of individual differences in affective reactivity may be important for theoretical as well as applied rea-sons. Affective individual differences have been studied most extensively within a univariate theoretical framework (e.g., Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Eysenck's arousal theory, 1967; Larsen & Diener's arousal regulation theory, 1987 ) and a bivariate theoretical framework (Gray's theory of the behavioral activation system and behavioral inhibition system, or BAS-BIS theory, 1970 , 1982 . One of the major differences between the univariate and bivariate frameworks is that univariate theorists hypothesize a single affective factor such that reactivity to positive events should be highly (and positively) correlated with reactivity to negative events. Simply stated, arousal theories predict that some people are more aroused by affective material; others are less aroused. In contrast, Gray postulated two separate motivational systems-one for positive affect and one for negative affect-that are mediated by distinct neuropsychological substrates. Reactivity to positive events is predicted to be largely independent of reactivity to negative events. The bulk of the evidence from conditioning paradigms (e.g., Gupta, 1976; Zinbarg & Mohlman, 1998; Zinbarg & Revelle, 1989) provides more support for the bivariate view (BAS-BIS theory). As a result, the present article will focus primarily on the bivariate BAS-BIS theory.
In Damasio's gambling experiment, expected values, losses, and gains were confounded (i.e., the "bad" decks lost overall but they also had the highest winning payoffs and the highest losses). Although Damasio interpreted his patients' failures as an insensitivity to the goodness or badness of the decks, a bivariate interpretation of the gambling results would be that the brain-damaged patients were extremely sensitive to the gain information and/or insensitive to the loss information presented in the task.
Overview of the Present Research
The present research examined the hypothesis that individual differences in affective information processing systematically influence the information that matters most in choice. Specifically, the present study attempts to test the claim that the intensity of the affective reaction to information determines its weight (or value) in choice. Individuals who report that they react more to particular affectively charged events are predicted to make choices consistent with these reactions.
Hypotheses. Two predictions were tested regarding the relation between individual differences and choice.
1. Reactivity to negative events was predicted to be negatively related to the number of choices from high-loss decks. 2. Reactivity to positive events was predicted to be positively related to the number of choices from high-gain decks.
Of course, the implicit assumption in most decision research is that analytical ability determines choices. Bechara et al. (1994) , however, claimed that the complexity of the card-selection task rendered impossible a calculation of net gains and losses in each deck. A measure of individual differences in analytical ability is used as a control variable in regression equations used to test the above two hypotheses.
Damasio and his colleagues assessed affective reactivity physiologically during the task. In the present study, self-reports of reactivity to positive and to negative events (unrelated to the task and assessed weeks earlier) were associated with choices.
The Present Research
In designing the present study, steps were taken to address the methodological limitations in previous studies. First, a learning paradigm was used (a modified version of Damasio's card-selection task) so that the stimuli were initially affectively neutral to all participants. Choices among the stimuli were tracked so that choice patterns could be examined over time. Second, the stimuli were complex mixtures of gains and losses. In each deck of cards, participants encountered both gains and losses.
A pilot study was conducted with Bechara et al.'s original card-selection task 3 to determine which measures of reactivity to positive and to negative events would relate most strongly to choices among high-gain and high-loss decks, respectively. One measure of negative reactivity (the BIS scale) and two measures of positive reactivity (Extraversion and BAS-Fun scales) were selected from this pilot study (see the appendix for the items used in the measures).
For the present study, the card-selection task was modified with several goals in mind. Most important, expected value was unconfounded from average gain and loss amounts in orthogonal contrasts of the payoff structure (see Table 1 ). Separating average gain and loss amounts from expected value makes it possible to identify whether individuals responded to gains, losses, or expected values. The second goal was to present stimuli one at a time to examine approach and avoidance behaviors separately for each deck. In this design, participants accept or reject the top card of a single deck that appears in front of them. In the design of the original task, all four decks are available at any one time, and selection of a card from Deck A might reflect a desire to choose from Deck A or, alternatively, might indicate avoidance of the other three decks. A third goal was to present the experiment on a computer to minimize the difficulty and therefore errors inherent in the experimenter's task. Fourth, whereas in Damasio's original task some participants chose all 40 of the available cards in a deck and therefore had to switch decks, the present study was designed such that a participant could choose all of his or her selections from a single deck.
Finally, the present study was designed to be more difficult than the original task to tax participants' reliance on analytical information processing and increase their use of affective information-processing skills. Hsee (1995 Hsee ( , 1996 found, for example, that increasing the difficulty of a choice situation led to greater preferences for an affectively preferred option. In the present study, each deck was offered individually; therefore, the task could not be simplified by ignoring one or more decks. In addition, gain and loss amounts were more similar in magnitude. In the original Damasio task, gains ranged from $50 to $100 and losses ranged from $30 to $1,250 across the decks; in the present study, gains ranged from $50 to $250 and losses ranged from $100 to $300 across the decks. Also, in the original task, the gains were constant within each deck (e.g., always $50 in Decks C and D), whereas gains varied within each deck in the present study.
METHOD
Card-selection task. Participants sat in front of a computer screen and were given the same instructions as in the original task, although the instructions were modified to be consistent with computerized presentation of individual decks.
During the experiment, the outline of a single deck of cards appeared in the middle of the screen with a large letter A, B, C, or D in its center. Participants pressed the "1" key on the number pad to select the top card from an offered deck or the "3" key to reject it. The computer tracked all responses and reaction times. Participants were asked to position their fingers on top of these two keys for the duration of the experiment. Below the computer screen was a piece of cardboard with four cards labeled A, B, C, and D to remind participants to relate the computer decks to real decks of cards.
When the participant chose the top card from a deck, that card was removed electronically, and the computer tracked the change to the participant's total. In addition, the computer displayed "You won (lost) $X." For wins, the experimenter paid the participant that amount of play money; for losses, the participant took play money from his or her own piles and paid the experimenter. Once play money was exchanged, and the participant had repositioned his or her fingers, the experimenter hit the "*" key to continue the game. If the participant responded "no" (pressed the "3" key), no feedback appeared, the top card remained on the deck, and the game continued. The next time that deck appeared, the same top card with its associated gain or loss would be offered again.
Before beginning the real card game, each participant practiced the card game with separate, computerized decks of cards. When the real card game began, the participant was given a loan of $4,000 of play money and a brief summary of the instructions appeared on the screen.
The program was designed to end after the block in which the participant chose his or her 100th card (this was not known to the participant). The order of presentation of the decks was in blocks of eight (two presentations from each deck), with card appearance randomized within block. The one exception to this was the first block of eight cards, which appeared in a single fixed order. In addition, the first two selections from any deck always won play money. These exceptions were made to eliminate any individual differences between participants who won versus lost in their initial selections from the decks.
Similar to the decks in the original Bechara et al. task, all four decks in the present study offered both gains and losses in varying amounts and frequencies. For example, in every 10 card selections from Deck A (e.g., choices 1-10, 11-20, etc.), participants encountered five gains totaling $500 and five losses totaling $750, whereas in each 10 selections from Deck C, participants received eight gains totaling $800 and two losses totaling $500. In addition, with each card selection in the present study, either a gain or loss was offered, but never both. (In the original task, a gain was given with each selection. Losses occasionally were meted out in addition to the gains.)
After the block when the 100th card was selected, 4 the game stopped and the computer displayed the participant's overall earnings (minus the $4,000 loan).
Individual difference measures and procedure. During an earlier prescreening session, participants (N = 168) responded to the affective and analytical information-processing measures identified in the earlier pilot study (BIS, Extraversion, BAS-Fun) along with other unrelated measures. The REI-Rational scale (Epstein et al., 1996) also was included to assess analytical ability. Cronbach's alphas for each measure averaged .79 (range = .73 to .86). The correlations between the scales are shown in Table 2 and were similar to the pilot study results. Approximately 40 participants each were selected from the top and bottom halves of scores on the BIS (measure of reactivity to negative events) and scheduled for individual sessions 2 to 8 weeks after the initial prescreening session. After arriving at the lab, a research assistant met the participant and led him or her to one of two chairs in a small room with a table containing a computer and play money. The participant sat at the computer while the research assistant sat at the end of the table with the play money between them. After signing an informed consent form, the participant completed a mood measure (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule [PANAS]; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and played the card-selection game. After completing the card task, the experimenter left the room. The participant completed a mood measure again and then indicated his or her feelings about each Deck A, B, C, and D on a 5-point scale (-2 = very bad to +2 = very good) as well as about whether each deck was better or worse than the other three decks on a 5-point scale (-2 = much worse deck to +2 = much better deck). These variables correlated strongly with each other (average r = .90, p < .0001). The average of the two variables was used in further analyses as an indicator of conscious knowledge about the deck at the completion of the task. Finally, participants answered some debriefing questions. They were debriefed, thanked, and given either partial class credit or $5 for their participation.
RESULTS
Data from 1 participant were removed due to an outside interruption of the computer game. Reaction times were examined for all other participants. The data of 7 participants who responded in less than 300 milliseconds to 10% or more of their card selections also were removed to exclude data from nonattentive participants. Mean response times for the remaining participants (42 women, 30 men, M age = 19.6 years) averaged 1,146 milliseconds and ranged from 562 to 2,095 milliseconds. No remaining participant responded more quickly than 300 milliseconds on more than 5% of his or her 100 card selections. Figure 1 demonstrates that the average participant learned to choose most often from Deck C, which offered gains with the highest frequency and had the highest expected value as well.
Demand Effect: Just Say No
Unexpectedly, participants said "yes" (pressed "1") the majority of times a deck was offered. The average proportion of yes responses over the course of the experiment was 62% (Mdn = 63%, range = 32% to 94%). All participants made at least 100 card selections, but participants could reject as many or as few cards as they wished. The number of no responses varied widely, with 1 participant making only 6 no responses and another participant making 210 no responses (M = 71.6 responses, Mdn = 59). Participants high on the REI-Rational scale tended to reject decks less often (r = -.31, p < .05, between REI-Rational scores and the number of no responses). No other measure correlated significantly with the number of no responses.
Because decks were offered twice each in every block of eight cards, and participants tended to accept offered decks, there was a tendency toward a more even selection pattern across the decks compared to the pilot study using the original Damasio task. In the pilot study, few participants (8.8%) chose about equally from the four decks (i.e., chose between 21 and 29 cards from each deck), whereas more than a quarter of the present study's participants (27.3%) did so. As a result, high and low scorers on any measure may not have differed substantially in the number of selections from the decks and the true relations between individual differences and choice may have been suppressed. 
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Figure 1
The number of selections from each deck over time.
Overview of Individual Difference Results
Nonetheless, results of the present research supported both hypotheses, particularly the first hypothesis that concerned reactivity to negative events. Greater reactivity to negative events was associated with fewer selections from high-loss decks; greater reactivity to positive events was associated with more choices from high-gain decks. REI-Rational scores did not explain a significant proportion of the variance over and above the measures of affectivity. Study results will be presented using regression analyses and correlations for simplicity of presentation and because correlations provide an indication of the direction and magnitude of the effect (D' Andrade & Dart, 1990). 6 To examine the effects of each of the measures on choices independent of the other measures, three regression analyses were conducted, one time each with the number of selections from good decks, from high-loss decks, and from high-gain decks as the dependent variable. The three independent variables in each regression were scores on the BIS, Extraversion, 7 and REI-Rational scales.
Hypothesis 1: Greater reactivity to negative events is expected to be associated with fewer choices from high-loss decks.
In the first regression analysis using the number of selections from the good decks (C and D) as the dependent variable, neither the model nor any of the three independent variables were significant. In the second regression analysis using the number of selections from high-loss decks (B and C) as the dependent variable, BIS scores uniquely contributed to an explanation of high-loss selections (b = -.35, p < .01); neither the REI-Rational scale nor Extraversion provided any other significant explanatory power (see Table 3 for the regression results). High-BIS participants demonstrated a noticeable sensitivity to losses by choosing less often from the decks with the largest losses (see Figure 2a) .
Within the complex deck structure, there exists one pair of decks (B and D) that offers a simplified glimpse of the relation between reactivity to negative events and choices from high-loss decks. The outcomes of choices from Decks B and D are similar. They pay the same average gain ($200) with the same probability of gains and losses (.5). One deck (B) is a losing deck, whereas the other is a winning deck. However, BIS scores did not correlate significantly with the number of selections from good and bad decks; therefore, this difference is not expected to be important. What appears most important in a comparison of these decks is that Deck B is a highloss deck (average loss = $250) and Deck D is a low-loss deck (average loss = $150).
As BIS scores increased, the proportion of participants who preferred (i.e., made more choices from) high-loss Deck B compared to low-loss Deck D decreased substantially. Quartiles of BIS scores were calculated. Among those participants in the lowest quartile, 56% preferred high-loss Deck B; in the highest quartile (those who reported being most reactive to negative events), only 15% chose a pattern of cards that reflected a preference for Deck B. The proportion of participants in each quartile who preferred high-loss Deck B (starting with lowest BIS scores) were 56%, 50%, 35%, and 15%.
Hypothesis 2: Greater reactivity to positive events is expected to be associated with more choices from high-gain decks.
With respect to the number of selections from high-gain decks (B and D), only extraversion scores provided unique explanatory power as expected (b = .30, p < .05; see Table 3 ). As scores on the Extraversion scale increased, the number of selections from the decks that offered the greatest gain amounts (i.e., the high-gain Decks B and D) increased as well. Figure 2b demonstrates highly extraverted participants' choosing more often from high-gain decks throughout the task until the last group of 10 selections, when low-extraverts appear to make a similar number of selections from these high-gain decks.
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PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN Similar to the pairwise analysis done for reactivity to negative events, a second simplified pair of decks exists to examine the association between reactivity to positive events and choices from high-(vs. low-) gain decks. The average gain of high-gain Deck D is $200, compared to only $100 in Deck A. Both decks offer the same loss and frequency of gains and losses. They do differ on expected value-Deck D is a winning deck, whereas Deck A is a losing deck-but extraversion scores did not correlate highly with the number of choices from good versus bad decks so that this difference is not expected to be as important as the difference in gain amounts.
Participants were placed in four quartiles according to their extraversion scores. The proportion of participants who preferred (made more choices from) high-gain Deck D relative to Deck A from the lowest to highest quartiles was 33% (in the lowest quartile), 50%, 55%, and 53% (highest quartile).
Conscious Knowledge and Affective Reactivity
The results thus far demonstrate that individual differences in affective reactivity are related to choices in predictable ways. What is less clear is how affect and knowledge about the decks might have emerged and influenced one another as well as choices.
Reactivity to negative events. It may be, for example, that high-BIS (compared to low-BIS) participants learned faster about the high-loss decks and deliberately avoided them as a result. If this is true, then high-BIS participants should believe that the high-loss decks are worse. However, BIS scores were not associated with conscious knowledge of high-loss decks' being worse (r = -.10, ns). In separate regression analyses, we examined the contributions of conscious knowledge about high-loss decks and negative affective reactivity (i.e., using BIS scores) throughout the experiment to examine (a) whether conscious knowledge and affective reactivity contributed independently to the prediction of high-loss choices and (b) whether affective reactivity contributed to the earliest choices from the decks when little knowledge could have developed. The 100 total card choices were separated into groups of 20 choices. In the first 20 card choices, BIS scores contributed significant unique explanatory power to the prediction of choices from high-loss decks (b = -.30, p < .05) (see Table 4a ); conscious knowledge did not offer unique explanatory power (b = .00). By the second 20 card choices, this relationship was reversed. BIS scores did not offer unique predictive power to the choices among high-loss decks, whereas conscious knowledge did (Betas = -.17, ns and .47, p < .0001, respectively).
Reactivity to positive events. Individual differences in reactivity to positive events (i.e., extraversion) were related, however, to conscious knowledge of high-gain decks' being better (r = .25, p < .05). Extraversion scores as well as conscious knowledge about high-gain decks' being better both explained significant independent proportions of the variance in the total number of choices from high-gain decks (bs = .22, p < .05 and .39, p < .001; see Table 4b ). Unlike the results of analyses with BIS scores, however, the results of analyses with extraversion scores did not reveal the purported reliance on affective processing early in the experiment.
Initial Mood State
An alternative explanation of the individual difference results in the present research is a mood congruency effect. Simply stated, individual differences may influence current mood state, which then influences choices in this task such that participants in negative moods may have been more reactive to losses, whereas those in positive moods may have reacted more strongly to gains. This alternative explanation was not supported. The correlation between positive mood scores prior to the task and the number of selections from high-gain Decks B and D was .17 (ns) and between negative mood scores prior to the task and selections from high-loss Decks B and C was -.04 (ns).
DISCUSSION
In the present research, self-report measures of affective reactivity, administered 2 to 8 weeks earlier in prescreening sessions, related in predicted ways to choices in a laboratory task conducted with individual participants in separate sessions. First, BIS scores (self-reported reactivity to negative events) were associated with fewer choices from high-loss decks. Second, a strong positive correlation was detected between extraversion scores (reactivity to positive events) and the number of selections from high-gain decks. However, results for BAS-Fun, another measure of reactivity to positive events, were not significant.
The present research has provided three important contributions. First, its results suggest that affect does Peters, Slovic / THE SPRINGS OF ACTION 1471 indeed play a role in decision making. The extent of our reactions to affectively charged attributes (e.g., gains or losses) may determine what attributes matter most in our choices among options. The results demonstrated, for example, that participants high in reported reactivity to negative events made choices consistent with placement of greater weight or value on loss information. Second, we demonstrated that individual differences in a non-brain-damaged population were associated with learning and choices among complex stimuli, each of which was heterogeneous with respect to gains and losses. Previous studies (e.g., Zinbarg & Mohlman, 1998) have examined the learning of homogeneous stimuli that offered either rewards or punishments or have examined choices among complex stimuli that did not involve learning (e.g., Slovic, 1969) . Third, the present study also extends Damasio's important ideas about the relation between affective reactivity and choices into a non-brain-damaged college student population. Similar to Damasio's participants, the participants in this study appeared to rely on affective feelings to guide them through this complex task. BIS scores were not related to conscious knowledge that high-loss decks were worse even though high-BIS participants chose less often from high-loss decks (implying that those decks were worse). These findings suggest that high-BIS participants did not deliberately avoid the high-loss options. In fact, higher BIS scores (but not conscious knowledge) were related to fewer selections from high-loss decks, even in the earliest selections from the decks when little conscious knowledge could have developed.
As Extraversion scores increased, however, conscious knowledge that high-gain decks were better also increased. High extraverts may have deliberately chosen high-gain options and/or their conscious knowledge may have developed from access to affective feelings developed through a somatic marking process. 8 We asked participants to report on conscious knowledge about the decks only once at the end of the experiment because we thought that the reporting process itself might interfere with the task (e.g., Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 1989) . As a result, our conscious knowledge measure is limited to the end of the task. We do not know, for example, whether some knowledge initially developed and influenced choices and then that knowledge changed as more was learned about each of the decks. Conscious knowledge and affective reactivity, however, did offer unique contributions to the prediction of choices, suggesting somewhat separable roles in choice for the knowledge on which we deliberate and the feelings that act on us. Reactivity to negative events, in particular, also played a role that was apparent in the earliest choices from the unknown decks.
The unexpected demand effect deserves particular mention. Participants in this task tended to accept offered decks. Because the offered decks were randomized, with each deck appearing equally often in every block, participants were more likely to choose equally often from each deck. With less discrimination between the decks, the relations between individual difference measures and choices likely were suppressed. This tendency could be attributed to less overall motivation in the computer task compared to the original task when real cards were used. Although analytical information processing has been the primary focus of decision-making research, the present article suggests that the oft-neglected affective processes deserve greater consideration. By integrating theory and methodology from areas outside of traditional decision research, results of the present studies revealed that individual differences in self-reported affective reactivity were related, as expected, to choices among decks of cards that varied in terms of gains, losses, and expected value.
Similar to previous results (e.g., Patterson, Kosson, & Newman, 1987; Zinbarg & Mohlman, 1998) , the present results are consistent with Gray's (1981) neurobiological theory of personality, which suggests that differential responsivity to positive (gain) and negative (loss) stimuli are rooted in biologically based systems. The present set of studies also have extended BAS-BIS theory into more complex decision situations by taking an additional step toward mimicking the complexities inherent in our world. Rather than presenting participants with simple stimuli that offer only gains or losses (e.g., Zinbarg & Mohlman, 1998) , the present studies have examined the influence of individual differences in a complex situation with four decks of cards that each varied with respect to gains, losses, and expected value.
In an extension of Damasio's important work with brain-damaged patients (e.g., Damasio, 1994) , the present article proposes that the extent of our reactions to affective objects may determine their weight (or value) in decisions. Damasio's groundbreaking work was based on a restricted population. In the present studies, it was predicted that college student participants would differ in the extent of their reactions to the gains, losses, and expected values in the decks of cards. These reactions were not measured directly. Instead, participants responded to self-report measures of reactivity to positive and negative life events. Affective reactivity, based on self-reports garnered weeks earlier and, of importance, in a nonclinical population, appeared to influence how participants valued gains and losses and how they chose among complex decks of cards.
It must be acknowledged, however, that capitalization on chance variation could have influenced which of several alternative measures of the same construct is the best predictor of a criterion in any given study. Thus, the conclusions above must be couched in tentative terms until the results with BIS and Extraversion are replicated in further studies. Results due to capitalization on chance processes are less likely for the BIS. Previous research with the BIS (reactivity to negative events) has demonstrated a relation between BIS scores and the avoidance of losses in other laboratory tasks. Zinbarg and Mohlman (1998) , for example, found that BIS scores were related to the acquisition of punishment expectancies when participants were faced with simple stimuli that were either ego rewarding or ego punishing. Surprisingly, they did not find a significant relation between BIS scores and the learning of monetary losses with simple stimuli. Carver and White (1994) also found that BIS scores significantly predicted participants' nervousness in response to simple punishment cues. Patterson and Newman (1993) report a series of studies to demonstrate that extraverts show exaggerated responding to simpler reward cues. In the present research, however, extraversion did not relate significantly to highgain choices in the pilot study (although it did in the modified study presented). In addition, a second measure of reactivity to positive events (BAS-Fun) was not related as predicted to choices from high-gain decks.
Concluding Remarks
Results of the present study pointed toward the importance of affective information processing in complex choice situations. Contrary to the implicit assumption in much decision research that deliberative thought is the hallmark of good decision making, results of the present study have suggested that affective processes play a critical role in determining choices and that these affective processes may sometimes influence choice without the chooser's awareness.
In addition, the present study represents a first attempt, to the authors' knowledge, to examine a bivariate view of affective information processing and choices using complex stimuli that differ in gains, losses, and expected values. Given the measures considered, the results provided support for the contention that individuals respond to loss information separate from information about expected value. Some support existed that individuals respond to gain information separate from expected value as well. Results from the present study and future extensions of it may have important theoretical and applied implications for the everyday judgments and choices people make. I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun. I crave excitement and new sensations. I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun. I often act on the spur of the moment.
NOTE: (r) = reverse-scored.
NOTES
1. Damasio's hypothesis includes the controversial notion that emotions are based in the body. We will not address a possible bodily origin of emotion in the present article. Instead, we will focus on another important issue he addresses-the relation of affect to real-life decisions.
2. Although extraversion generally "concerns individual differences in the preference for social interaction and lively activity" (Rusting, 1998, p. 168) , it is also considered a broad positive emotion trait that may serve as a predisposition to the processing of congruent information such as rewards (e.g., emotion-congruent processing models; Bower, 1981) .
3. This pilot study had two primary aims. First, college-student participants (instead of brain-damaged patients and non-brain-damaged controls) played Damasio's original card-selection task (see Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994 , for the task design) to determine if enough variability in performance would exist to relate it to individual difference measures. Although Damasio found strong effects using this complex and interesting task, there was no guarantee that less extreme groups would produce such different effects. Second, the study was designed as a pilot study to examine whether individual differences in affective reactivity would relate to choices among the cards. Although multiple measures existed (and were assessed in this pilot study), it was unclear based on previous studies which measures would relate best to choices among stimuli that varied with respect to gains, losses, and expected value. A complete list of the individual difference measures considered is available from the first author. We expected and found that participants high on measures of reactivity to negative events (particularly the Behavioral Inhibition System [BIS] scale developed by Carver & White [1994] ) made fewer choices from the decks that bore the highest average loss amounts. However, participants high on measures of reactivity to positive events did not make significantly more selections from the decks that offered the highest average gain amounts. Carver and White's (1994) Behavioral Activation System Fun Seeking subscale [BAS-Fun] and Saucier's (1994) Extraversion scale had the strongest correlations with choices from the high-gain decks, however, and were selected for further use.
4. The number of card selections actually could range from 100 to 107 because the program ended after the block in which the 100th selection was made. Theoretically, this could allow up to 107 yes responses if the participant chose every card in the last block. For purposes of analysis, only the first 100 selections were analyzed for each participant.
5. Additional measures also were included for exploratory analyses (see Peters, 1998) .
6. One-way, repeated-measures MANOVAs (RM MANOVAs) also were conducted-once with the total number of cards selected from each deck and again with the linear slope of changes in participants' choices over time from each deck. For each RM MANOVA, the deck variables (either the overall number of selections or the changing number, or slope, of selections from each deck) were the withinsubject (repeated-measures) factors and a median split of the individual difference measure was the between-subject factor. Planned contrasts were conducted to test the specific hypothesized interactions between card selections and individual differences. Results of RM MANOVAs with each measure with planned contrasts for high (vs. low) loss decks (for the BIS) and high (vs. low) gain decks (for Extraversion and BAS-Fun) were similar to the regression results and will not be reported.
7. Increases in BAS-Fun scores were not significantly associated with more choices from high-gain decks (r = .13, ns) and were not examined in further analyses.
8. "If you come to know that an animal or object or situation X causes fear, you will have two ways of behaving toward X. The first way is innate; you do not control it. Moreover, it is not specific to X; a large number of creatures, objects, and circumstances can cause the response. The second way is based on your own experience and is specific to X. Knowing about X allows you to think ahead and predict the probability of its being present in a given environment, so that you can avoid X, preemptively, rather than just have to react to its presence in an emergency. . . . In short, feeling your emotional states, which is to say being conscious of emotions, offers you flexibility of response based on the particular history of your interactions with the environment" (Damasio, 1994, p. 133) .
